Environmentalists Are Becoming “a Figure of Hatred” in EU

CHRISTIANE AMANPOUR, CHIEF INTERNATIONAL ANCHOR: Across Europe, the far-right is breaking into the political mainstream. Extremist parties are gaining support and forming coalitions within the government. Catherine Fieschi is director of policy and strategic outreach at Open Society Foundation focusing on Europe and Central Asia. And she joins Hari Sreenivasan to discuss this moment in European politics.

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HARI SREENIVASAN, INTERNATIONAL CORRESPONDENT: Christiane, thanks. Catherine Fieschi, thanks so much for joining us. First, I guess for maybe our American audience and our overseas audience, kind of set the landscape for us a little bit. When we think about the political right or the far-right, how is the gaining ground in Europe?

CATHERINE FIESCHI, DIRECTOR, OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATIONS EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA: So, I think in Europe, to some extent, it’s been gaining ground probably from the early ’80s in various places. First in France, then in Italy. Then, you know, gradually more and more, the Scandinavian countries. Now, we even have Germany. Of course, there’s details of Poland and Hungary. And what we see is that, you know, in a very basic way, the way that they are gaining ground is that they are either in some places the most important opposition party or they’re in encouraging government or they are basically, you know, getting ready for government. So, you know, this is a very basic measure. They are winning elections, right? And I would say that, you know, the other measure is that possibly, you know, they have become the parties that have set the agenda, whether it’s on migration and increasingly on the environment, whether or not they are actually in government, they are managing to set the agenda for the whole of the political scene and the political landscape. So, the combination of the two back means that we’re now in actually what I think is quite a dangerous situation in Europe.

SREENIVASAN: So, let’s go maybe country by country here. Let’s start with Italy right now. It’s a dominant far-right party that is in control. How do we get there?

FIESCHI: Well, would get there — Italy is a really interesting case. Because, you know, we get there in Italy through a number of ways. There’s been a long kind of slow rise of all sorts of challenger parties, right? You know, we had the radical left and then the rise of the radical right, then the radical right and the radical left in coalition together and then, you know, a kind of technocratic, more stable government. And I think, you know, what we see in Italy is that, you know, this kind of very technocratic government, in Italy as in elsewhere, you know, generally we know that this is the kind of precursor for people reacting to policies who — which they think are, you know, kind of taken without the interest of the people in mind and, you know, essentially too technical and too opaque and too disconnected from what ordinary people thinks politics is about. So, this is what we have in Italy. And we have a coalition which is really interesting, because it’s got a dominant, in a sense, ultraconservative neofascist party, you know, as the main coalition partner with Giorgia Meloni. She’s definitely the most — important most, if you like, popular party in Italy. But she does not quite have the votes to do it on her own, so she’s to cobble together this coalition. So, you’ve got this weird looking coalition of people who don’t particularly like each other —

SREENIVASAN: Yes.

FIESCHI: — (INAUDIBLE) to govern together.

SREENIVASAN: What are the issues that are animating the rise of the far- right in Germany and Austria? I mean, countries that have for so long dealt with Nazi history and really to run 180 degrees from it for decades?

FIESCHI: We tent to put them together, but actually, the stories are really quite different because, you know, what’s shocking about Germany is the fact that actually Germany has, in a sense, you know, done a lot in education terms, in — you know, in its cultural life, in its kind of collective narrative to really come to terms with its past, to really own it, to move beyond it. And so, the rise of the IFD and, you know, a political option on — you know, on the far-right is something, you know, that is still very shocking to a lot of people. And it’s a very — it’s a relatively recent phenomenon, the IFD. And I think that, you know, one of the things that we know about Germany is that Germany is going through a lot of transitions at once. You know, it’s — first of all, Merkel who have been in power for a long time is no longer there. So, it’s certainly was a transition away from her. Then, you know, it had to really sort of, you know, revise its attitude toward its energy policy, its attitude toward Russia, whom it had tried to treat to, you know, treat as a partner, it’s going through a rough time economically. And of course, the IFD is something that is based mostly in the former East Germany where, you know, economic conditions are, in any case, even on a good day, nowhere near as good as in — you know, in what we might still call West Germany. So, there is an economic backlash there. But also, I think, you know, a slight backlash, kind of a nostalgic major knee-jerk reaction because Germany is feeling it’s losing its footing a little bit. There is — the national narrative is being called into question in all sorts of ways. Austria on the other hand, I mean, we have to keep in mind that, you know, Austria, didn’t do all of that work that Germany did on its own past, right? It tried to bypass that kind of collective consciousness and owning of the past in order to do better. And actually, the far-right was — you know, the FPO, which is the far-right party, I mean, was actually in power in Austria back in the 2000, right? That’s the first time that it was — that it, you know, already sort of, you know, became important. So, they have ebbed and flowed since, but they’ve been an option on — you know, on the electoral map, you know, for essentially the better part of 40 years at this point.

SREENIVASAN: You know, there’s also the idea that, listen, if these are the leaders that people elect, that’s kind of the bargain we signed up for with democracy, that these are people and parties that are able to make the case better, that they are able to weigh the hearts and minds. Now, underlying that is the notion that it’s a fair fight, that it’s a level playing field. I mean, what is your response to that?

FIESCHI: I think that, you know, increasingly it hasn’t necessarily become a fair fight or — and it’s less and less of a level playing field, because I would argue that, you know, many political leaders who are not part of these parties, whether on the — they’re on the mainstream left or the mainstream right, you know, they will hesitate to use, you know, some of the tactics that these parties use, right? So, you know, I would argue that most of us, you know, however we lean, most of us who are in the kind of mainstream of politics, you know, we probably would not — in a sense, wouldn’t have the heart and actually would feel pretty immoral using the kind of tactics that they use. For example, we feel bad about lying and being caught lying. You know, on the other hand, you know, look at Meloni, you look at Marine Le Pen, you know, you look at Orban, they really don’t care, you know, if they are caught out, you know, in a big lie. They sort of shrug and say, well, that just goes to show that I’m willing to do anything, you know, to actually defend the interests of the people, right? I’m not hemmed in by these bourgeois constitutional considerations. You know, I’m a man of the people. I defend the people. And if it takes lying, I will lie, right? So, these are things that, you know, just — that were just not very a good theme to adopt, you know, in terms of tactics. But the other thing that I would say — and you’ve put your finger on it, it’s an important point, it’s very hard to argue that these parties are not democratic parties. You know, it’s very hard to say that these — some of these leaders or, you know, the way that they get elected is anti-democratic. And I’ve always been very careful about saying that, actually. they are not anti- democratic. They are just disposing a kind of democracy, the kind of democracy that we don’t like, which a kind of, you know, an oppressive will of the majority to the exclusion of every minority view. And of course, this is — you know, this a big problem in societies like ours that our diverse societies, you know, where, in a sense, the social contract that we have in our democracies is that, you know, you win some, you lose some, you know, you’re not always on the losing side, you’re not always on the winning side, but, you know, by and large, you know, everyone has a voice. The kind of democracy that they put forward is the one that — you know, that the founding fathers, you know, the American founding fathers, you know, warned us against, which is, you know, one that is simply an oppressive majority, right? So, I think that, you know, the — as you say, this may be a democratic expression. The final point, if I may on this, is that one of the thing that we see is that once these parties are in the game, whether they are, you know, a credible opposition or whether they are part of government or whether they are leading government, they get their hands on some key institutions, which basically means that the game from then on is rigged. If we look at, you know, somebody like Orban, for example, there is no immediate freedom, there is no, you know, judicial freedom. And therefore, in a sense, you can shape reality to your own needs. People think they are voting for something but, you know, they’re not getting the whole story because you control the story. And we’re seeing this in Poland and we’re seeing this increasingly in Italy and we’re even seeing it, you know, increasingly in France. Once they have power, they get their hands on the levers, and then they shape the reality that people will see. So, the choice is not a real choice.

SREENIVASAN: You know, as you lay out these characteristics, I’m listening and I’m saying, hmm, capture of the judiciary and capture of the press leads to an unfair fight going forward. And of course, I have to apply this to the United States. And I wonder what are the lessons that are kind of going back and forth? Is there almost an ecosystem of support? Because I have never seen as much interest in Hungarian politics as I did over the last few years in the conservative media in the United States in espousing and supporting Viktor Orban who, maybe two administrations ago would have been considered an authoritarian dictator, but here we are.

FIESCHI: I think that one of the things that we shouldn’t underestimate is actually the links between these leaders and the links between these parties. You know, when CPAC starts to organize, you know, events in Europe, including in Hungary, it means that — you know, that there is money flowing behind it that the, you know, certain media outlets that are lining up, you know, behind this kind of Transatlantic cooperation, and it stretches across from the United States and Europe. And I think that, you know, this suggests to me that what many of us thought for a long time, which is that because we are talking about nationalist parties, they would never cooperate with one another out of nationalisms, if you like. In fact, you know, they are starting to see that, you know, cooperation, you know, has its rewards. And this could well happen, you know, at the level of Europe as well, in the aftermath of the European elections, parliamentary elections which are taking place June of 2024. One of the things that we worry about is, you know, some of these far-right or right-wing populist parties, you know, really getting huge scores, particularly pushing back on quite a sophisticated and expensive environmental policy agenda. You know, and at that point, you know, the fear is that they will cooperate with each other much more effectively, and that they will cooperate with the mainstream right, right? You know, that what we will see is a kind of an increase in the radicalization even of mainstream right parties who stemmed to gain from associating with the harder right.

SREENIVASAN: Traditionally, one of the platform planks of a far-right party in Europe or elsewhere has been tied to a certain nationalism, has been easily identified as somebody that cares about the other, and that might be the immigrant, that might be that somebody who is coming in from outside to take the jobs, et cetera. And I wonder if you are seeing different minority communities even within. And what I’m thinking of right now is kind of anti-LGBTQ legislation, not just in the United States but also in parts of Europe or even really attacks on women’s rights in places that we thought were otherwise progressive safe havens.

FIESCHI: Absolutely. And, you know, I think that in — you know, Orban probably set the tone on — you know, on this early on, not just anti-immigrant, anti-Roma, but also, you know, very much pushing back on, you know, women’s rights. Certainly, the — in the Polish case on abortion, which has been a huge issue in Poland with the current government, you know, really trying to crack down on it. And, you know, Polish citizens really trying to push back. But, you know, where we also see it where I think is interesting is in the Scandinavian countries, right? So, Scandinavian countries that have always been kind of, you know, trailblazers in terms of particularly women’s rights. The pushback in a place like Finland or Sweden isn’t just on immigrants but it’s also on the fact that, you know, the other here is the women who have taken the service jobs, right? And, you know, in a way it makes sense. It’s those places that were furthest ahead like the Scandinavian countries on particularly gender rights that, you know, were the pushback is most conspicuous and it’s no longer just traditionally the migrant or the immigrant, but it is increasingly, you know, other perceived minorities. The final other that I would mention and then I think it’s taking shape, you know, really under our eyes in Europe is the kind of middle-class environmentally conscious citizen who is, you know, starting to become, you know, a figure of hatred. You know, trying to push an environmental agenda, trying to raise the alarm on climate change, you know, they are considered, you know, a kind of elite that is — that also needs pushing back on.

SREENIVASAN: How much is the rise of the far-right a response to the left taking its eye off of the ball?

FIESCHI: I think it is a huge part of it. I mean, it’s quite clear if we want to get these voters back, there needs to be a credible social offer, right, a credible offer of taking their needs, you know, their views seriously and, you know — and meeting these needs and being in conversation with these views. It’s really very clear. And so, you know, what these parties have understood is that people want to talk about politics in a kind of, you know, more connected way and they offer a connection, which, you know, progressives have failed to do for a while.

SREENIVASAN: From the Open Society Foundations Europe and Central Asia, Catherine Fieschi, thanks so much for joining us.

FIESCHI: My pleasure. Thank you.