Historian Tareq Baconi on the Origins and Future of Hamas

MICHEL MARTIN, CONTRIBUTOR: Thanks, Christiane. Tareq Baconi, thank you so much for speaking with us.

TAREQ BACONI, HISTORIAN: Thanks for having me.

MARTIN:I just wanna make it crystal clear that you are an historian. You are not a spokesman for Hamas. You are not an apologist for Hamas. You are an historian who has studied the movement for many years. So with that being said, give us the short course on how Hamas developed. What, what’s the origin story?

BACONI: Well, Hamas really is a chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is a movement that’s present in different iterations throughout the Middle East that is committed to what it calls the islamization of society. So really it’s, it started as a social network that looks at providing educational facilities, healthcare, charitable work training vocational centers.  And it really embeds itself in society as a movement that’s committed to helping Palestinians live a virtuous Islamic life. Now, in 1987 at the beginning of the first Palestinian intifada, when Palestinians rose en masse against Israel’s occupation, that Islamic party, which was present in the Palestinian Territories, spun off into what came to be known as Hamas. Hamas is the Islamic Resistance Party. It’s essentially a national party committed specifically to the liberation of Palestine through the use of armed struggle. It’s believed that the only way that Israel can be compelled to end its occupation of the Palestinian people is through resistance and armed force.

MARTIN: Was there a pivotal moment when Hamas created its own movement, as it were, sort of apart from others that were already there? Was there like a pivotal event?

BACONI: Yeah, it was the beginning of the first intifada. So, Hamas’ parent, let’s say, the Muslim Brotherhood umbrella from which it emerged believed in one thing. It believed that in order to achieve liberation, Palestinians need to have a virtuous society. So it focused on the social elements rather than on the political or military element of resisting the occupation.  At the beginning of the first Intifada, we saw Palestinians engage in popular struggle throughout Palestine against Israeli occupying forces. And Israel responded with force famously at the time, Yitzhak Rabin called on the Israeli army to ‘break the bones of all the protestors’ and here we’re talking about mostly children going out to fight with, with rocks against tanks. That’s sort of the famous thing. So Hamas at the time, saw this as a very critical escalation and decided actually that its long-term project of liberation through its islamization had to be switched on its head. So rather than islamize before liberation, the splinter group decided that actually the way now is to engage in armed resistance against the Israeli occupation forces as a mode of liberating Palestine.

MARTIN: I noticed that you used the term “national movement,” obviously others, other analysts do as well. There’s a lot of debate about what to call Hamas and I understand that from your writings that you think calling Hamas a terrorist group kind of misrepresents reality. So first of all, what do you call them and why do you say that calling them terrorists, misrepresents the reality as you see it?

BACONI: So I refer to Hamas as an Islamic resistance movement, and it’s a Palestinian national movement – so the best way to describe it is an Islamic national movement in Palestine. And the way that I refer to it in this way is because the movement is committed to the liberation of Palestine, it has never thought of its calling or its political project as extending beyond the land of Palestine. It’s specifically focused on liberating Palestine from Zionist colonization. So in that sense, it’s a national movement in the same way that other chapters of the Muslim Brotherhood in the region, like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, is confined to Egypt. And it defines its ideology through Islam. And that’s why it’s an Islamic national movement.

MARTIN:It’s not like Daaesh or ISIS, as it were, which is seeking sort of a regional caliphate?

BACONI: Absolutely. And that brings me up to the second point you asked about terrorism. The reason why it’s manipulative to use that term is because it misses that nuance and it decontextualizes Hamas. So it suggests that Hamas is engaging in armed resistance or violence for the sake of violence. It misses the point that Hamas is engaged in armed resistance against a colonial force – a force that’s maintaining an occupation that’s illegal under international law. When Western policymakers engage with Hamas only as a terrorist organization, they’re suggesting that that can be dealt with militarily. They’re abdicating on their responsibility of dealing with the question of Palestine, politically.

MARTIN: Well, what a key point of difference, though, between Hamas and the PLO is that the PLO has recognized the right of Israel to exist, and Hamas never has. And the whole point of Hamas’ charter, which makes clear its refusal to recognize the state of Israel. And also the text has been replete with anti-Semitic references built on stereotypes about the Jewish people. I mean, how, how are we to look at that? I mean, obviously, the way that a number of analysts look at that is that this is A) it is blood lust, and B) that it’s kind of a fantasy that Israel will be kind of wiped off the face of the earth. And so I’m just – I’d just like to hear your take on that.

BACONI: Yeah. So there’s two points that you’re raising here, both of them very important. So first, in terms of the PLO’S recognition of the state of Israel, we have to remember that before the PLO recognized the state of Israel, it too engaged in armed resistance. And it too was deemed to be a terrorist organization by the US and other members of the international community. And the demand on it was that it would renounce armed resistance and recognize the state of Israel in order to establish the state of Palestine.  Fast forward three decades, and Palestinians don’t have a state. Palestinians have more entrenched occupation. We have an Israeli regime that is more fascist than it’s ever been in history that’s expanding its colonial violence against Palestinians in the West Bank in Jerusalem and Palestinian citizens, as well as tightening the blockade. So the idea that the recognition of Israel has – would pave the way for Palestinian rights – has completely been undermined by the way the international community has refused to hold Israel accountable. And so the second point then is Hamas. Hamas sees the PLO’S experience. It understands that the recognition of Israel is not going to lead to Palestinian rights because we have that history. We see that track record. And so, the movement rather believes that the best way to secure Palestinian liberation is through armed resistance. And at the negotiating table, which Hamas does not dismiss, it openly talks about possibly negotiating. But that has to come from a position of force. I just want to say one point about Hamas’ antisemitism. Hamas’ charter was antisemitic. The movement engaged in awful tropes around the Jewish people, including dealing with texts like the elders of Zion. And in dealing with stereotypical tropes around the Jewish people controlling the media and controlling world powers. Now, the movement, since its early inception has evolved quite significantly. And in 2017, it issued a new document, which it sought to replace its original charter. And in that document, it openly distinguishes between Jews and Zionists and articulates that its project of liberation is against Zionist colonialism and Palestine not against Jews as a religion or people.

MARTIN: What I’m asking you though, is it still the vision of Hamas that Israel should be eliminated?

BACONI: The way—

MARTIN: If not, what is their vision of what should occur?

BACONI: The way that Hamas talks about its vision, and I should say that it’s not, this is not necessarily the vision that is shared by many Palestinians. Hamas’ ideological vision is that it would liberate Palestine. What that means is that it would create a state as it defines it, that is grounded in Islam, and that has Islam as its founding principles under which Jews, Christians, and Palestinians would live in equality. That’s how Hamas defines its political project. Now, what that means in practice is unclear. And it doesn’t necessarily mean the destruction of the state of Israel in the way that that phrase is manipulated to mean, which is throwing Israeli Jews into the sea, that’s not necessarily a part of their political project. I’m sure there are members in Hamas that would believe that they should be doing that. But the political project as it defines it, is the creation of a state in Palestine in which all three religions can live. And it would be a state that’s grounded in Islam.

MARTIN: But why has Hamas had elections since the 17 years so that they could demonstrate that they have a mandate for their vision for Palestine? You know, why not? I mean, if they weren’t able to, if they had the means to develop this complex series of tunnels, you know, underneath, you know, the strip, which was allowed them to mount these attacks, then why have they not been able to institute other principles of governance, which would demonstrate that they have a mandate?

BACONI: That’s, I think that’s a really good question. So, in the last set of elections that happened in the Palestinian Territories, Hamas democratically won the elections. So it was chosen by the Palestinians thousand six, living under occupation in 2006 to come into a system of government. And those elections were deemed fair by international observers. The US and Israel started a regime change operation against Hamas when it won the elections democratically and facilitated a civil war between Fatah, which is now ruling in the West Bank, and Hamas, which is now ruling in the Gaza Strip. So when we’re talking about the next round of elections, we’re talking about two things. First of all, will the international community, including the US, accept if Hamas emerges as a democratic victor? Because right now, in 2021, the last poll shows us that it’ll win. So why would Hamas engage in another Democratic election if that result is going to be overturned by force, by the international community? And the second question is that to have democratic elections, it has to be in Palestine, which means including the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Right now, Israel has, and this is the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu speaking, not me, has openly endorsed the policy of separating the Gaza Strip from Hama, from the West Bank and playing divide and rule. So all efforts to engage in a unity government or to engage in democratic elections are actively undermined by Israeli authorities.

MARTIN: You have a piece in the New York Review of books that I actually found fascinating. You say that there’s something of a symbiotic relationship between the Netanyahu government and Hamas. And in fact, one of the points that you made is that the very isolation that the Netanyahu government has instituted and maintained of the Gaza Strip, actually allowed Gaza to kind of develop its resistance movement more thoroughly. So could you just say a little bit more about that as briefly as you can.

BACONI: Absolutely. I think it’s a really important question. So, over the course of the past 16 years Israel’s political establishment, and certainly their military establishment, believe that they can contain Hamas in the Gaza Strip. What that means is that they believe they can tolerate and even enable Hamas to operate as a governing authority in the Gaza Strip, thereby taking responsibility for 2.3 million Palestinians and Gaza. And that would allow Israel to deflect its responsibility as the occupying force of those Palestinians. So by placing Hamas, or by allowing Hamas to continue to exist as a governing entity in the Gaza strip, Israel effectively severed Gaza from the rest of historic Palestine. And in so doing, essentially got rid of 2 million Palestinians from under its immediate control. So in other ways, demographically engineered itself as a duet majority state. Now, to maintain Hamas as a governing authority, Israel relied on something the military establishment called “Mowing the Lawn,” which meant that every few years it would carry out a military assault on the Gaza Strip to try to undermine Hamas’ military capabilities. And in exchange, it would expect Hamas to continue to exist in Gaza, reign in resistance from Gaza and acquiesce to remaining under blockade. Now, during that time, it’s now clear that Hamas has been using its role as a governing entity in the Gaza Strip to develop a military arsenal and to shift back that dynamic. So rather than accepting to continue to live silently under blockade, they were preparing to turn the tables at Israel and reassert the Palestinian project.

MARTIN: One of the things that we hear from Israeli leaders at this juncture is that they have no choice in the way they are pursuing their project now – particularly in the wake of this gruesome attack. Are you saying that Hamas feels the same, that they have no choice?

BACONI: Well, no, I actually completely disagree with that take from the Israeli political establishment. 

MARTIN: But Do you disagree with that take from Hamas? Because, because one of the, one of the arguments here is that the capabilities that they demonstrated in building up this military arsenal and resistance… at least some of that could have been directed toward improving the lives of the people living in Gaza. And they chose not to do that.

BACONI: So what, what, so let me ask you this. What would improving the lives of Palestinians and Gaza look like if Hamas invested in healthcare and invested in education and in invested in infrastructure, and the Palestinians and Gaza are enjoying a better quality of life while Israel continue to maintain a hermetic blockade, which means that food, medicine, fuel, electricity is still controlled by Israel. The majority of the Palestinians and Gaza are below the age of 16. They’ve never left the Gaza strip, and they’ve suffered numerous wars and military assaults by Israel on the Gaza strip. So what we’re saying is Hamas should have invested in making the lives of Palestinians and Gaza better while they remain in their prison cell. 

BACONI: So for Hamas, if they are actually looking to overturn that reality of the blockades to break out of the blockade, there is no way other than armed resistance. And that is not something that the movements got to easily. Hamas over the course of the past few years, let’s not talk about its history of 30 years. Over the past few years, Hamas has engaged in various other tactics. It’s offered for Palestinians and Gaza to engage in popular struggle, which meant that Palestinians and Gaza mobilized through, through civil disobedience and popular marches up to the fence area. In 2018, that was one of the biggest civil society peaceful protests led by the Palestinians in Gaza, actually in Palestinian history. It lasted for months. Israel responded to that with sniper fires. Over the course of two months, it killed more than 200 Palestinians civilians, including medics and journalists, and, and resulted in the amputation of more than 36,000 limbs in the Gaza Strip. So popular resistance didn’t work. Hamas offered negotiations at various points in its history. Those were completely dismissed as terroristic, the movement has engaged in other options. But Israel has made it clear that the only way it’s interested in dealing not only with Hamas, but with Palestinians more generally, is through force, is through military reprisals, not through political means.

MARTIN:But the suicide bombers, I mean, the fact of the matter is that has been a continuous tactic of, of, of Hamas.

BACONI: The suicide bombers were hugely contentious for Hamas and for Palestinians more broadly. And by the way, Hamas wasn’t the only party that engaged in suicide bombing so did Fatah, which is now sitting in the Palestinian authority in the West Bank. And those were hugely contentious, precisely because they were targeting civilians and they were indiscriminate. So obviously they were war crimes. But the movement, as did the Palestinians more broadly, in the history of their struggle, engaged with armed resistance in a manner that, you know, they thought about the moral implications of that, and they thought about the strategic implications of that. And it was never a straightforward question. But the truth of the matter has been that in the past, Israel has responded mostly to force and actually actively militarized the Palestinian movement. So even in, when we want to talk about the suicide bombings in the second Intifada, the second Intifada began as a popular mobilization by the Palestinians. Israel militarized that from the earliest days by shooting on Palestinian protestors and civilians, and locked the two in a cycle of violence.

MARTIN: What would you like to see happen? If you feel comfortable saying, what should happen now?

BACONI: The only way for this cycle of violence to end and for security to be enjoyed by Israelis and Palestinians is for the demands of the Palestinian people – which are demands already recognized in international law – are secured. Those demands are clear. The demands of the refugees to return to their homes and for Palestinians to be allowed self-determination to have a state of their own. Until we begin engaging with Palestinians politically, not militarily, there will be no security for Israeli Jews. And that was very clear from the Hamas attack on October 7th.

MARTIN: Tareq Baconi, thank you so much for speaking with us.

BACONI: Thank you, Michel.