“The Afghanistan Papers”

YOU POINT OUT IN THE BOOK.

IN JUNE OF 2004, LIEUTENANT GENERAL DAVID BARNO, THE COMMANDER OF U.S. FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN BOASTED TO REPORTERS FROM THE TALIBAN AND AL QAEDA WERE SCARED OF FIGHTING THE AFGHAN ARMY, QUOTE, BECAUSE WHEN THEY DO, THE TERRORISTS COME OUT SECOND BEST.

HOW ILL-EQUIPPED THE AFGHAN ARMY WAS AND HOW DIFFICULT IT WAS FOR U.S. TROOPS TO TRAIN THEM?

BIANNA, YOU CAN'T SQUARE THAT.

THIS IS WHAT WE HEARD TIME AND AGAIN OVER THE LAST 20 YEARS FROM AMERICAN GENERALS AND PRESIDENTS AND OTHERS, WAS THAT THEY KEPT BOASTING IN PUBLIC THAT THE AFGHAN ARMY AND THE PARA-MILITARY POLICE THAT WE WERE TRAINING AND EQUIPPING, THEY SAID THIS FORCE WAS GOING TO TAKE IT TO THE TALIBAN, THAT THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO DEFEND THEIR GOVERNMENT AND THIS WAS THE GUY FOR U.S. TROOPS BEING ABLE TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY.

BUT IN THE DOCUMENTS I OBTAINED THROUGH THE BOOK, YOU HEAR TIME AND AGAIN FROM U.S. MILITARY TRAINERS AND OTHER MID-LEVEL OFFICIALS WHO HAD NO CONFIDENCE AT ALL IN THE AFGHAN ARMY.

THEY SAID THEY COULDN'T SHOOT STRAIGHT, MOST OF THE RECRUITS WERE ILLITERATE.

MANY OF THEM COULDN'T COUNT OR TELL THEIR COLORS.

MANY OF THEM WERE HIGH ON DRUGS OR WOULD STEAL FUEL AND OTHER EQUIPMENT.

THEY RESERVED MOST OF THEIR SCORN FOR THE AFGHAN COMMANDERS WHO THEY DESCRIBED AS INCORRIGIBLY CORRUPT AND THEY WERE POCKETING A LOT OF THIS MONEY AND EQUIPMENT WE WERE SENDING OVER THERE.

U.S. MILITARY OFFICIALS KNEW FULL WELL THE AFGHAN ARMY WASN'T MUCH OF A MATCH FOR THE TALIBAN, BUT, AGAIN, THEY KEPT TELLING THE PUBLIC THE OPPOSITE.

BUT THE U.S. ARMY, AND LET'S GO BACK TO THOSE FIRST FEW MONTHS THE U.S. HAD BEEN IN AFGHANISTAN.

BECAUSE THE U.S. ARMY HAD BEEN A GREAT MATCH TO THE TALIBAN AND HAD BEEN VERY SUCCESSFUL IN DEFEATING MOST OF THE TALIBAN IN THOSE EARLY FEW MONTHS OF THE WAR.

MANY NOW QUESTION, WHY DIDN'T IT END JUST THEN?

WELL, THE MAIN REASON IT DIDN'T END THERE WAS BECAUSE AFGHANISTAN WAS A DEVASTATED COUNTRY.

IT HAD BEEN RUINED BY DECADES OF WAR, EVEN THOUGH THE TALIBAN HAD BEEN REMOVED FROM POWER, THERE WAS NO INFRASTRUCTURE LEFT.

THERE WAS REAL CONCERN ABOUT A FAMINE.

THERE WERE MILLIONS OF REFUGEES AND THE UNITED STATES HAD A RESPONSIBILITY TO TRY AND STABILIZE THE COUNTRY.

BUT IN THOSE EARLY YEARS OF THE WAR, THE BIGGEST DEBACLE WAS THE U.S. TOOK ITS EYE OFF THE BALL AND WAS FOCUSED ON MOVING TO IRAQ AND PLANNING FOR THE INVASION OF IRAQ.

YOU SEE THIS IN MEMOS IN THE BOOK IN WHICH BUSH ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS ADMIT THAT THEY STOPPED PAYING ATTENTION TO AFGHANISTAN, THAT GENERAL YOU QUOTED EARLIER SAID IT BECAME EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO GET OFFICERS TO STAFF HIS HEADQUARTERS IN KABUL AND THAT THE ARMY BACK IN AUGUST JUST WASN'T INTERESTED IN GIVING HIM RESOURCES.