A Neutral Ukraine, Nuclear Threat & Russia’s Doomed Economy

CHRISTIANE AMANPOUR: Now, President Biden’s off-the-cuff comments in Warsaw over the weekend. We’re not a call for Russian regime change, says the White House. Fiona Hill is a former national security officials specializing in European and Russian affairs, and she was an impeachment witness against Donald Trump in 2019. She spoke with Walter Isaacson about the impact of Biden’s remarks and how Putin is likely to react.

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WALTER ISAACSON, CORRESPONDENT: Thank you, Christiane. And, Dr. Fiona Hill, welcome to the show.

FIONA HILL, FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL: Thanks, Walter. Thank you.

ISAACSON: Biden, in his powerful speech this weekend, ended what seemed like a bit of an ad-libbed line, but one that seemed to have a kernel of truth to it, which is, good lord, this guy cannot remain in power. Do you think that was a mistake for him to say it? Or was that a morally clarifying statement that will guide us?

HILL: Well, I mean, to be honest, obviously, what he said there was what’s on an awful lot of people’s minds. And it’s a question that people keep asking. From the perspective of trying to deal with this conflict right now and trying to get Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin to pull back and halt the hostilities, I think it was actually a pretty risky thing to say, because Vladimir Putin obviously is pretty paranoid that the United States is out to get him. He’s been convinced for years, in fact, that we have had him in our crosshairs, that we have been in the business of regime change. And if he indeed believes, contrary to what the White House has said since then, that that was meant in a broader sense in terms of the ongoing war and the dominance within the region, but if he indeed believes that this means that President Biden and others want to have him ousted, then he’s going to double down, because it’s the last thing that he wants to happen to him.

ISAACSON: You say he might double down, that this phrase of Biden’s might cause him to go even further. Tell me what that could mean.

HILL: Well, doubling down could also mean just digging in even further, if we see what I mean, because, right now, we have seen the battlefield shifting. This hasn’t been going in the way that he initially intended. I mean, there was every evidence that the Russian thought that they would be able to take over Ukraine in a matter of days, certainly not weeks, and now stretching off into months. He may be then just digging down for a much longer conflict, a long grind, to actually inflict as much devastation as he possibly can to Ukraine to teach them a lesson and us a lesson as well. So, in 2015, President Putin had Russia, the Russian military intervene in Syria. The express point of that was to make sure that Bashar al-Assad stayed in power. And now, seven years on, Bashar al-Assad is indeed still in power, in fact, has started to go out and about in the neighborhood, meeting with other leaders. And so the point from all of this is that Putin is pretty determined as well to make sure that he is still in power. So we can say that he should go, but he will do everything that he possibly can to make sure that he can in place.

ISAACSON: You have spoken about the possibility that he would use battlefield or tactical nuclear weapons. Do you think this is still a possibility? And did this past weekend speech make it slightly more of a possibility?

HILL: I don’t know whether the speech made it slightly more of a possibility because, look, to be frank, irrespective of the speech, Putin has been convinced that he has to do whatever it takes to win. And he has been definitely contemplating the use of battlefield nuclear weapons, perhaps even some with a longer range. We have seen the Russian government announced they have used the Kinzhal, which is one of their missile systems that can also be nuclear-power potentially. The same with the Iskander missiles that we know that they have positioned in Belarus. We have known for some time that Putin and the military planners certainly think about the possibility of using nuclear weapons in the event where they think that the war is not going in their favor, any kind of war, that they have practiced for these contingencies, they have planned for these contingencies. We have called it escalate to de-escalate. In other words, they do something that most of the rest of us would not contemplate to get everybody else to back down. And the mere fact that they have put the forces on alert, that they have had former President Dmitry Medvedev go out and talk about these kinds of possibilities, that’s intended to intimidate us and intended to make it very clear that they mean business. And so Putin is testing whether we are going to back off, in other words, to give him what he wants him and to push for a negotiation on terms that he’s starting to lay out.

ISAACSON: Tell me what would happen if he used battlefield nuclear weapons. How would the West — you have been a member of the National Security Council staff? How would the West have to respond?

HILL: Well, this is going to make things extraordinary difficult, isn’t it? Look, I think what we would have to do is have a major international response as well. I mean, I think, already, we need to be doing some pretty serious diplomacy behind the scenes with other nuclear powers, because it’s not just Western powers that are nuclear these days, either, is it? I mean, we have China with a very large strategic arsenal, and also building up its own stores of strategic — of tactical, as well as medium-range nuclear weapons. We have been trying to engage the Chinese on the nuclear front. We’re supposed to have the Non-Proliferation Treaty review this year coming up in the summer, which has already been postponed over and over again. If Putin and the Kremlin took this step, they would cross the threshold of use that hasn’t been crossed, obviously, since the detonation of nuclear weapons during World War II. We have all said that was impermissible. That’s been the basis of the strategic balance during the Cold War. It’s been the strategic balance basis between other nuclear powers like India and Pakistan. This would literally open the proverbial Pandora’s box. So what we’re going to have to do is get ahead of it, and keep pushing on diplomacy to make sure that it is made crystal clear to the Kremlin that this is unacceptable on a global international level, not just in the relationship and the standoff between Russia and the West that he’s trying to thread.

ISAACSON: What is the military doctrine of the U.S. if there is a use of tactical nuclear weapons in an engagement in Europe that we’re involved with?

HILL: Well, we have been going backwards and forwards on our, basically, strategic nuclear posture. And I’m not sure how much we have contemplated this. I mean, I would actually defer to the Pentagon and to others to ask them for clarification for this, because I think it’s very risky also to speculate. We have to make this crystal clear in official communications and back-channel communications, not just trying to telegraph it during interviews on television, because the Kremlin scrutinize this very closely. They jump on to every word that every commentator and other makes. They’re trying to interpret themselves. But I think this is one where we have to be extraordinarily clear on a government-to-government, military-to-military and in an international framework, rather than making speculative commentary.

ISAACSON: In the other major news this weekend, President Zelenskyy gave a very interesting interview to four Russian journalists, which, by the way, was censored, so that the Russians couldn’t hear it. But he expressed a willingness for diplomacy that would have as part of its endgame a neutral Ukraine. Let’s start there. Does that make sense? Can he declare neutrality? And might that give an off-ramp to the Russians?

HILL: Well, it depends on how that’s done. And I’m sure that he’s doing this, so he’s trying to himself scope out the possibilities. I mean, he’s going to have to be able to sell it at home as well. And it can’t be a neutrality that leaves Ukraine defenseless. If we look back to the 1990s, when Ukraine was neutral, and Ukraine was not a member of any military alliance, it was given guarantees by the United States, the United Kingdom and Russia of its territorial integrity and sovereignty and independence in the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, when Ukraine gave up the Soviet nuclear arsenal that it had inherited. All the way along, Ukraine has, in fact, been neutral until relatively recently when it made joining NATO a feature of its constitution, which can certainly be changed. The question is, what are the guarantees of Ukraine’s safety and security? And that will have to be something that’s hashed out. Neutrality shouldn’t mean basically neutering, a complete neutralization of not being able to have the possibility to defend their territory.

ISAACSON: What we’ve seen is President Zelenskyy talking about neutrality. We’ve seen the Russians send signals that they’re more interested now in focusing on the Eastern Ukraine and not trying to take Kyiv or the whole country. Can you see as a diplomat what the outlines of a possible solution are and what would you propose if you were sitting there saying, OK, I’ve been made the negotiator, let’s try something along these lines?

HILL: Well, I think it gets to the point you’ve just said about trying things along different lines. I think you have to be very adaptable and flexible, make sure that it’s very clear what the floor is below which you’re not prepared to go. I think President Zelenskyy himself, by opening up the discussion about neutrality, being very kind of careful about how he’s scoping it has already set forward on one of the tracks in which the Russians have expressed a pretty clear demand, which is that Ukraine should not be in NATO. The Russians have also made it very clear that what President Putin is seeking is the recognition of the annexation of Crimea as an official part of the Russian Federation. I mean, that’s something that that might also be able to be played with in some way, and what I mean by played it in a diplomatic play, figuring out different formulations there that might be able to address both the concerns of the Ukrainians about the territorial integrity and the demand that the Russians have put on the table. And, of course, it will all depend on how the Russians think that they’re doing on the ground on the battlefield. There could be exactly a risk that they’re deflecting attention away from other places and intend, in fact, to either continue with the level of attacks that they already are engaging in or even step it up if we think that they’re actually diverting their attention elsewhere.

ISAACSON: Given President Biden’s statement that he cannot remain in power, and clearly, it’s up to the Russians to figure out how to do its own regime and leadership, are there ways in Russia that you see that there could be a transition in power? Could there be a people’s revolt? Could the military decide to change? Could his own ministers — we’ve seen a couple of them resign — decide there has to be a change in power, or is that not likely?

HILL: Well, again, look, it’s very dangerous in many respects to speculate, again, because the Kremlin and others will be watching these and other kinds of commentaries. I’m wondering if they can gauge in this what our intent is. But let’s say Vladimir Putin himself is supposed to have an election, a presidential election in 2024. That’s two years from now. Of course, our assumption was after there was an amendment to the constitution in 2020 that Putin would probably seek at least another six-year term that would take him out, obviously, to close to the end of this decade and potentially another six-year term after that, which would then have left him in power for 36 years. So, basically, there is some junctures, 2024 and again in another six years if Putin does in fact remain in power where there is a presidential election that gives an opportunity for a change, a change that could be managed in some way. There could be a successor that’s designated. The group around Putin, you know, could work together to smooth something over. But 2024 has got to be looming pretty high in Putin’s mind and in the minds of everybody else around him. Unless, of course, now, the war is still grinding on and they decide to then declare martial law, and then I think all bets are off and some of the other scenarios that one might come contemplate could possibly come into play if the situation in Russia gets dire. But let’s just say, this is very uncertain, this is highly fluid, and it’s also a very dangerous moment for the West as well as for Russia.

ISAACSON: You’ve written co-authored a book called “Mr. Putin: An Operative in the Kremlin,” I think is how you describe him, and you say in some way he’s not ideological, that he’s very much just a maneuverer and one who believes in the state, a real statist. Tell me how that plays into what he’s doing.

HILL: Well, look, I think over time it’s not that he’s become more ideological, but he’s become much more fixed in his views. Since we finished the book, of course, quite a lot has happened since then. And what we’ve seen is Putin become much more obsessed with history. That was one of the factors in the book. We had a whole chapter called the history man about how Putin interprets Russian history and starts to increasingly place himself in it. I think now, Putin is thinking all about his place in history. His legacy. He sees himself in the pantheon of the Russian czars and of the great Soviet leaders, clearly on par with Stalin who was in power for 30 years, and, of course, had some twists and turns in his time in office there. And Putin has become very much fixed on himself in the state as being fused together. And that’s part of the problem that we’re facing right now.

ISAACSON: Your description of him as history man and obsessed with history, of course, brings up the (INAUDIBLE) to those who cannot remember the past are doomed to repeat it. As a history professor, I sometimes worry there’s a corollary that leaders who remember the past too well are condemned to repeat it. Do you think that that may be a problem, is that he’s so obsessed with Russian history?

HILL: I think it is. It is. I think that one of the things that we really see here is that he has found it very hard to disassociate himself and the present from the past. Everything that he has said about Ukraine is basically a mishmash of historical time periods put together in one narrative that he himself has formulated, that any professional historian and Russian historian and regional historian could easily poke holes in. And he started to see himself, as I said, you know, earlier, as — in many respects as kind of an embodiment of the Russian state, and the people around him have actually said on numerous occasions that there is no Russia without Vladimir Putin. So, this makes the stakes extraordinarily high for all of us. How you deal with somebody who is operating in a framework where they think themselves and the state are fused together and they can’t really step back from this.

ISAACSON: Let me put this in the larger context of history. You’ve written a great book. I read it this weekend, I’ll recommend it, which is “There is Nothing for You Here,” and I think that refers to the economic opportunities in Russia but also around the world, that we’ve gone through a period in which economic opportunities and growth have been problematic, especially for people who used to get up in the morning, play by the rules, and think they could succeed. How do you think this moment in history is being determined by big, large forces in your book?

HILL: Well, unfortunately, we were already before we got into this war in Ukraine or rather Vladimir Putin put us into this war in Ukraine, starting to enter another phase that I described in the book. I mean, I — the starting point in the book is really the 1980s and the deindustrialization that many countries, particularly the United Kingdom and the United States started to experience from that juncture on, and the impact of that ultimately had on socioeconomic situation, and then feeding into populous politics. As you mentioned, I did talk about what happened in Russia in the 1990s when this — the country moved extraordinarily rapidly from state-based economy to a private market-based economy. Now, over time, Putin has put the state back in that economy again, and we are seeing now with the sanctions and the cutting off of Russia from the economy a huge blow to the Russia that Putin has built up since 2000 in his period and the presidency. Russia is going to go into a very steep recession. Many of the gains that the Russian economy and the Russian population, as a result, made over the last 22 years since the dislocations and the wrenching rapid deindustrialization of the 1990s are going to be lost. I fear that we’re going to be in another major period of dislocation and shift. This is not going to be a very easy period for any of us in Europe and in the United States to manage. There’s lots of opportunity there as well. But we’re going to have to pay very close attention to the people who get left behind. And in Russia itself, I think this is really going to be a return to those severe dislocations and political upheavals over the period that they thought they’d left well behind at the end of the 1980s and in the 1990s, and we’re going to have to figure out how we reintegrate Russia, how war is not with the Russian people, but the problem is how to get Vladimir Putin and the people around him in the Kremlin who decided to embark on this war to change their course.

ISAACSON: Dr. Fiona Hill, it’s always great to talk to you. Thank you so much.

HILL: Thank you so much, Walter. It’s been a privilege. Thank you.