Biden’s Fight to Restore American Foreign Policy Post-Trump

CHRISTIANE AMANPOUR, HOST: President Joe Biden met with top congressional leaders today, pressing them to pass his aid package for Ukraine and Israel. The failure so far to do so is hurting Ukraine and undermining America on the global stage. Politico national security reporter Alexander Ward takes a look at how Biden’s foreign policy team copes with all of these challenges in his new book, “The Internationalists: The Fight to Preserve American Foreign Policy After Trump.” And he joins Walter Isaacson to talk about the effort to repair America’s global reputation.

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WALTER ISAACSON, CO-HOST, AMANPOUR AND CO.: Thank you, Christiane. and Alex Ward, welcome to the show.

WARD: Thanks for having me.

ISAACSON: Your new book, “The Internationalist,” is sort of a group biography of all the people doing Biden’s foreign policy. But one of the focal points is Jake Sullivan, one of the smartest people in the democratic foreign policy establishment in the past 15 years, and you start with him the night that Hillary Clinton, his patron, loses to Donald Trump and he figures out what the problem may have been. Tell me about that.

WARD: Yes. I mean he — you know, as you said, he was a — he grew up sort of in the traditional democratic foreign policy establishment and he is next to Hillary Clinton as she’s conceding to Trump. And what he’s starting to figure out is, you know, Trump may not necessarily have won because of his foreign policy views, but he didn’t lose because of them either. So, what was it about what Trump was saying that was appealing to so many millions of Americans? So, out of power, Jake and friends spend about four years, and I call it the wilderness, trying to figure out what it is that was really appealing to so many people and what could be brought in to a democratic foreign policy thinking framework to update it for the 21st administration, and they come up with a phrase you’ve a lot during the Biden administration, which is a foreign policy for the middle-class. Their basic point is any foreign policy decision that is taken by the United States needs to be easily explained to the everyday American as to why it benefits them. And if that cannot be done, then that might not be a foreign policy direction worth pursuing.

ISAACSON: Well, you say it’s a foreign policy geared to the middle-class, and you use some examples like a little bit more trade restriction here or there or help for an industrial policy. But what does that really mean? That doesn’t seem like that adds up to that much more when it comes to changing foreign policy.

WARD: Not necessarily, but let’s talk about the way they frame it. So, let’s take Ukraine. They make two general arguments. One is the reason the U.S. needs to defend Ukraine is because if Russia is not stopped there, it will go into a NATO country eventually, and that will require the U.S. to come to that NATO nation’s defense, meaning American sons and daughters will go to war, meaning a lot more money will be spent on that fight, meaning it will be an even costlier in terms of blood and treasure endeavor than it is now. And then there’s the second aspect of it, which is we are sending our old military equipment to Ukraine at this point, for them to use against Russia, which means we need to develop newer, more advanced weaponry to make our military stronger. And what that means is manufacturing jobs in Ohio, in Mississippi, in Michigan, in Texas, in Kansas. And so, there is a real middle-class jobs benefit to this defense. That’s why they don’t necessarily want to send troops. They don’t think that’s worth it. They think that Ukraine is doing a well enough job with the older weaponry we have, but we can actually defend Ukraine and improve the middle-class economic position with the policy they’re pursuing.

ISAACSON: But it seems that the Ukraine war has been — or our support for Ukraine has been justified more by a support for democracy, and that seems a core to what Biden represents. Defending democracy wherever it seeks to flourish, as John Quincy Adams would say. How does that fit in? It doesn’t — I mean, maybe you cast it as, OK, we make a few more weapons here in factories, but it doesn’t seem like it’s the core of the new Biden-ism you talk about.

WARD: I think it is to an extent, but the way they frame it is as you talked about, in democracy, nothing gets Joe Biden more animated than being seen as the protector of democracy worldwide. That is what he likes more than the general public at this point, unless we forget, in the 2020 election, one of the things he was arguing was Donald Trump is not a small D democrat. That democracy was on the line. It’s the same argument he’s going to make in 2024. And he’s tried to connect the fight for democracy worldwide with the fight for democracy at home. That you can’t necessarily say you can be a strong democracy if you’re not helping it flourish elsewhere in the world. So, that is a big part of it. But sort of the second order arguments are Trump-type arguments, these foreign policy-to-the-middle-class-type arguments, that would not have been made if it were not for the rethinking that they did and Trump’s victory in 2016.

ISAACSON: The big news this week in terms of great geopolitics is that Hungary has agreed now to let Sweden into NATO. We got Finland into NATO, now Sweden. That’s a huge shift that, over the past 50 years of foreign policy establishment, nobody would have dreamed of that expansion of NATO. How big of a deal is that? And is that just serendipitous or is that something that the Biden administration was pushing for?

WARD: They were certainly pushing for it. Although, we have to say that this is, you know, Finland and Sweden’s own doing. They saw what Russia was up to in Ukraine and they had been aggressive in the Arctic region and North European region for a long time. And so, they saw a moment to join NATO and it worked. You know, the public — their publics were on their side. And of course, Joe Biden, a big NATO fan, liked, you know, the fact that NATO would expand under his watch. And so, this is why he says the line consistently, you know, that Putin was hoping for the Finlandization of NATO and he said he got the NATOization of Finland. So, this is a big win for him and his strategy of trying to bring allies on board with everything the U.S. is doing. In their mind, you go a bit more slowly, but you go further with allies and they would argue that, you know, say Russia had done this under Trump’s watch, one, you would not have the staunch U.S. defensive Ukraine, most likely, but you want to have allies come along as part of this western wall to keep Russia at bay.

ISAACSON: Your book has a lot of great reporting nuggets. And one that struck me was General Mark Milley trying to convince Biden not to do the abrupt withdrawal from Afghanistan. Tell me about that discussion and about the fallout from the withdrawal from Afghanistan, the way it was handled.

WARD: Yes, Milley, along with a lot of other generals at the time, were adamant that the U.S. should keep some presence in Afghanistan. They were arguing roughly between 2,500 and 3,500 troops because they were worried that the Taliban would eventually storm to power. And Milley, who had, you know, commanded in Afghanistan, has lost, you know, troops in Afghanistan, was telling Biden, look, if we leave, you know, women will be sent back to the Stone Age. The education for women will falter. The democratic progress that had been made in that country will go away. But Biden was looking for a strategy from the Pentagon and others as if, if I am to commit more troops to Afghanistan, if I am to continue this 20-year war, what does victory look like and how do we get there? And what resources do this require? In over four months of discussion, no one could convince President Biden that staying in the war was a good idea, that a victory could be achieved. And so, he made the decision to withdraw. And of course, we saw the chaos that ensued. I should note that in that decision to withdraw, baked in, was an intelligence assessment that said it would take 18 to 24 months for the Taliban to take over the country. Of course, that was a rosy timeline, seeing as the Taliban would be fully in power in August. So, that’s only a few months from the decision in April. And of course, we saw 13 service members killed during the evacuation. We saw a humanitarian strike outside the airport in Kabul. We saw the horrific scenes of people falling out of planes. And we saw Afghan allies of Americans left behind. But we also saw a pretty miraculous logistical feat to get 120,000 or so people out as Kabul and Afghanistan was crumbling. So, on one hand, you have to hold that, yes, Afghanistan is worse off because of the decision to withdraw. And you also have to hold on the other side the logistical feat that it took to take — get as many people out during a tumultuous time and consider the strategic ramification. Would it make sense for the U.S. to be in a war that no one — for which no one could articulate a vision of victory? Biden didn’t see it, that’s why we were out.

ISAACSON: Well, you said it was a great logistical feat to get everybody out. And yet, if you see the disorganization, and even you write about it, as if it’s a bit of a hubris to think it would have been easier, shouldn’t people with this much knowledge and this much intelligence have prepared more for the withdrawal?

WARD: Well, this was one of my questions, is didn’t no one in these meetings think that 18 to 24 months was a bit too rosy, a bit too positive an assessment? And what they said, was not really. And of course, over time, as the Taliban was sweeping through the country, you know, that timeline shifted or, you know, declined and shrunk, but the decision was made. And the military was thinking, look, speed is safety. We got to get out as quickly as possible. So, they were on a faster timeline than even the White House suggested. And the people of the State Department that were thinking, hey, we need to reform this program to bring the Afghan allies of Americans home. They didn’t have the time or worry with all to do it because they were worried about the diplomats in Kabul and calling allies to get people out. So, it was a miss. We cannot deny that. It was a miss that they really didn’t prepare for the Taliban. And there was already public reporting, as I note in the book. There was already public reporting about what the Taliban was preparing to do and how quickly they could do it. Not that there were questions about the Afghan military’s ability to withstand that onslaught. So, there are genuine questions to ask of the Biden administration of whether or not they miscalculated in thinking that it would not take so long, or two, that it would take a lot longer for the Taliban to do what they did. And I should know, you know, Biden, to this day, believes it was still the right decision to leave. He asked no one to resign, no one offered to resign. And if you’ll ask them today, they still hold by those views.

ISAACSON: You write about how strong Biden was in coming to the support of Ukraine. And yet, you also talk about an awkward relationship he had with President Zelenskyy. Explain how they had to balance that.

WARD: We sort of already know that Biden and Zelenskyy did not get along and see eye to eye in the run up to the invasion. But the book reveals that that relationship was really, really bad, screaming match bad. At certain points, Biden was basically telling Zelensky, why don’t you believe the intelligence we’re showing you, that we’re showing our allies, the Russians are coming, you need to prepare. And recall that there were military assessments, one of many, but the stark one was that Kyiv would fall within 72 hours. And throughout all these months of Biden and Zelenskyy chatting, Zelenskyy never believed that this was going to happen. He believed that they would be — that Putin would be too stupid to do that, that it made no sense, that the Ukrainians didn’t have intelligence to show that. And you did have Biden saying, look, you’ve got to start protecting your capital, you’ve got to start protecting your country. In the end, Zelenskyy was able — and his military and his team were able to defend Kyiv and were able to defend many parts of Ukraine, and nothing sharpens the mind like seeing Russian tanks roll into your nation. But for many months, the Biden administration today would still probably tell you behind closed doors that, sure, a lot of time was missed for preparation for Ukraine. Although critics would note this of the Biden administration, there are those who would say the U.S. should have sent weapons a lot sooner to Ukraine to prepare their military for a greater defense and perhaps sanction the Russians even before an attack. And this is actually one of the reasons why Zelenskyy wasn’t so confident in the American assessment. Because he would tell Biden, if you really believe this is happening, why aren’t you, the U.S. and European allies, flooding my military with weapons? If you really believe an invasion is to come, I don’t see you guys panicking as much as you should be.

ISAACSON: And what’s the answer to that? Why weren’t we?

WARD: Because they — the feeling was they didn’t want to give Putin necessarily a reason to escalate. Recall that during that period, the U.S. and the West were negotiating with the Russians, in genuinely good faith. You know, Putin was putting out these arguments that it was because of NATO expansion and, you know, Ukraine tilting westward as the reasons for why he was considering doing this. Now, there are some ahistorical issues there that are a lot to get into. But the U.S. said, fine, if that’s true, let’s talk it through. Let’s solve this at the table and not the battlefield. And so, that was part of it, is that to then pump Ukraine full of weapons might have damaged that diplomatic process. Obviously, it didn’t work. Putin still invaded and he did what he did. But that was the general bet, is that if you help Ukraine too soon, if you arm them too soon, then Putin’s going to have no choice but to go in sooner.

ISAACSON: As we speak, Israel, the United States, the Arab States are struggling in this notion of can we get a ceasefire in Gaza? And Israel seems to be resisting what is generally with the consensus pushed by the Biden administration. Has Biden’s history, his sort of history over the years in the Middle East helped him here or is he somewhat handicapped when it comes to dealing with the situation in Gaza and trying to get a ceasefire?

WARD: I think it’s helped him, but he’s never really faced a situation like this. I mean, let’s consider Hamas’ brutal attack on October 7th led the — affected the entire nation of Israel to back a military campaign to root them out of Gaza. And Netanyahu, who is not a popular figure, is being supported in that campaign. And his far-right government wants to root Hamas out. And again, you’ve got the public behind him. So as much as Biden, you know, knows Netanyahu, deals with him, the domestic context in Israel makes it a lot easier for Israel to rebuff American swazure (ph). What the Biden administration would say here is, look, you know, we’re doing our best to support Israel’s right to self- defense and push the Israelis to allow as much support for the Palestinians as possible in this case. They’re trying to have it both ways, but it’s leading to a lot of messaging muddle. And at this point, it’s very clear that they are struggling to get Israel to do exactly what they would like Israel to do. And so, they’re trying to find new ways to get Netanyahu to follow an American playbook.

ISAACSON: The U.S. pretty much tried to focus on China and other things and to take a focus off of the Middle East at the beginning of the Biden administration. Jake Sullivan gave a speech right before the Hamas terrorist attack, saying that things have been quiet there and we could put it aside. In retrospect, do you believe and do you think they believe it may have been a mistake not to focus more on the Israel-Palestinian situation?

WARD: I bet now they would say that. But even in a few months before they wouldn’t have. We should note that one of the big criticisms of the Biden administration is that they significantly ignored the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and let that to fester during their time in office. Now, I should note that in the months before the October 7th attack, as the U.S. was working with Israel and Saudi Arabia to have a normalization of relations, a key component of that was to improve the Palestinian situation, give them a pathway to a state, allow more humanitarian aid in, give them a sense of belonging. And that was pushed pretty strongly by the U.S. and they would not accept — they would not endorse a deal, a normalization deal without it. But for many, that was far little too late. That they should have been focusing on this issue from the beginning instead of letting that wound fester for many years. And one of the criticisms of both, I should say, the Trump administration and the Biden administration, is that they did this as a bank shot, right? The Trump administration didn’t think about the Palestinian issue when they were doing the Abraham Accords. That was wholly ignored. And while the Biden administration continued the Abraham Accord push, they left the Palestinian issue for far too late and it was a side bit. And so, they were — their criticism is their goal of, if we do normalization with Arab states, it would make it easier to help Palestinians. Well, that may have been true over time. It’s certainly not true after October 7th. And so, that bank shot strategy did not work.

ISAACSON: You’re just back from the Munich Security Conference a week ago. Tell me what the mood was like there, both on Ukraine and in U.S. foreign policy in general.

WARD: Amazingly gloomy. I mean, I expected — I didn’t expect happiness, right? It’s a tough period. And of course, the news of Alexei Navalny’s death occurred in the early days — in the first few hours of that conference. But I was expecting, and many were expecting, there’d be some sort of plan to come out of there. And everyone, from U.S. officials, you know, congressional leaders, European officials, other officials, they all left with kind of hands in the air going, no one knows what to do. But there was a sense that basically the plan — only plan A and the only plan is to get something through the House. And so, the amount of European officials who asked me what a discharge petition is, would astound you. That’s how close they’re paying attention. One thing I even heard, and this is from Senator Sheldon Whitehouse and also Senator Brian Schatz, both Democrats, they talked about a story Zelenskyy told them, which is of a Ukrainian soldier in the trenches on the front lines taking artillery fire, but scrolling on his phone for any signs that the package would pass the House. That’s where we are. That’s how gloomy the picture really is. And no one could necessarily articulate a way forward. And so, if you’re a team Biden, you’re seeing one of your signature foreign policy achievements, let’s say, the defense of Ukraine, crumble before your eyes.

ISAACSON: Alex Ward, thank you so much for joining us. Appreciate it.

WARD: Thanks so much for having me.