How to Prevent a Cold War With China

CHRISTIANE AMANPOUR, CHIEF INTERNATIONAL ANCHOR: We dig deeper now into Beijing’s latest moves. Professor Jessica Chen Weiss was a senior adviser to the State Department until last year. And she is joining Walter Isaacson to talk about this.

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WALTER ISAACSON, HOST: Thank you, Christiane. Jessica Chen Weiss, welcome to the show.

JESSICA CHEN WEISS, PROFESSOR FOR CHINA AND ASIA-PACIFIC STUDIES, CORNELL UNIVERSITY: Thanks so much. It’s great to be with you.

ISAACSON: China’s chief foreign policy minister, Wang Yi, met with Putin this week. Wang Yi had just come from the Munich Security Conference and he said he was working on a peace plan from President Xi Jinping of China. What do we know about that peace plan?

WEISS: We don’t know yet. I mean, we’ll have to see, but I’m not really expecting anything dramatic to break ground. China has, I think, consistently been playing a really difficult strategic game here, balancing on the one hand, you know, wanting to have a close partnership with Russia, which Xi Jinping sees as China’s most important, you know, partner in resisting perceived U.S. efforts at containment. And on the other hand, not wanting relations with the United States and the Europeans to go too far south. And so, I think that what we will see here in the coming days, you know, further elaboration of the Chinese government’s efforts to try to, you know, continue to manage this difficult straddle, if you will.

ISAACSON: But isn’t it in China’s deep national interest to have this war in Ukraine settled?

WEISS: I think on the one hand, you know, the continuation of the war puts China in a difficult position. But they also don’t see a whole lot of, you know, political upside in pushing Putin to end this. And so, with the two sides pretty dug in, in fact, perhaps gearing up for further escalation, I think China would like to see this issue, you know, in some ways simmer down, but not necessarily be something that they necessarily feel that they want to be, you know, on the front lines of managing. But we will see. This is a bigger step and they’ve taken today. And I think, you know, it reflects the interests, particularly on the European side to see China play, you know, a more active role in trying to mediate, perhaps. You know, but this is, I think — from the longer perspective, I think China has taken here is really with an eye toward, you know, balancing against the United States. And so, China does not want to see Russia defeated. You know, but whether or not China can see the two sides de-escalate and whether they have, you know, really a lot of diplomatic capital invested here, I think we will have to see.

ISAACSON: Secretary of State Anthony Blinken said that he was worried and warned Wang Yi against China sending lethal weapons to the Russians, to help in Ukraine. Do you think China will do that?

WEISS: I think this is ultimately guided by the Chinese recognition that to-date Putin probably is a bit dissatisfied with the extent of China’s support, which is largely been confined to the diplomatic and areas which, you know, haven’t been subject to international sanctions. But as, you know, Putin needs to replenish, you’ve we’ve seen and the Biden administration has indicated that there have been non-lethal forms of assistance, dual use types of goods that have gone from Chinese entities to Russian entities. And I think the question here, you know, really remains, you know, what is it that, you know, we will ultimately see as driving China ‘s strategic calculus here. You know —

ISAACSON: What is driving its strategic calculus?

WEISS: Well, ultimately, I think China’s going to have to balance its need to, you know, resist the United States against its desire for, you know, continued access to international technology, markets, and capital, you know, that reflects that continuing dilemma. And so far, at least, I think there’s a question as to whether or not the Chinese government sees any strategic upside again to limiting its, you know, long-term partnership with Russia So far, at least, the growing tensions in U.S. China relations, the growing concern that the United States and China are headed for a showdown over Taiwan, not necessarily because China wants such a conflict, but because actions by whether it’s in Taiwan or by the United States are pushing in that direction, I think only consolidates the — Xi Jinping’s belief that it needs a stalwart partner in Russia to resist what the storms to come. And so, until we see, I think, you know, not just threats but potential assurances that if China doesn’t go forward with this assistance that there would be some better trajectory ahead in China’s relationship with the West.

ISAACSON: How do we offer that better — we, meaning the United States — offer that better trajectory?

WEISS: Well, I think the most important issue is, of course, that of Taiwan. And I think that here, it’s critical that we deter rather than provoke Beijing on that issue. I think the administration is quite clear that we have, you know, stand by our one-China policy. But I certainly think that there are numbers of Congress and others who, you know, maybe campaigning for election that have gone much further and said that the one- China policy has outlived its utility and that we should recognize Taiwan as an independent state. Those are the kind of statements that I think really, you know, do damage to the long running prospects of peace and stability in a non- confrontational relationship with China. And so, it’s there that if we don’t make those assurances on — you know, that we aren’t supporting Taiwan independence. So, if we can’t make those clear and credible, I think, it’s going to be hard for us to assure really the world, not just China, that the United States wants, you know, non-conflictual productive relationships, even if it’s competitive and testy at times with Beijing.

ISAACSON: Do you think there was a mistake for speaker of the house, Nancy Pelosi, to go to Taiwan when she did?

WEISS: You know, I visited Taiwan in December. And I think they recognize that maybe the costs that it brought were greater than the benefits of her visit. And so, these kinds of symbolic shows of support for Taiwan, however understandable, don’t necessarily leave the island and its 23 million residents any better off. And so, what I would like to see in our support for Taiwan are meaningful ways to, you know, build resilience, including through, you know, stronger economic ties to the island and find ways to do what needs to be done quietly rather than, you know, waving the red flag.

ISAACSON: Let me read you something that Wang Yi, the Chinese top foreign affairs official, said at the Munich Security Conference. He said, U.S. bias and ignorance against China has reached ridiculous levels. The U.S. has to stop this kind of absurd nonsense that’s done out of domestic political needs. I find that a very strong statement. But then, also, found myself saying, well, there is some truth to it. What do you think?

WEISS: You know, oftentimes, the cases in which Chinese rhetoric or propaganda kind of hurts the most is when it shines a light on the things that we ourselves are, I think, having trouble with, which is, you know, developing — you know, despite the administration’s best efforts, are kind steady as she goes, you know, here is what we need to do to, you know, get our own house in order and lead internationally, when you have, you know, a public conversation, which is all about, you know, getting as tough as possible. And in often cases, I think, really playing to upon and exaggerating the threat that China poses. No question, China is a challenge. It’s an authoritarian system. Very different from ours. But at the end of the day, China is not really going anywhere. There are a lot of ways in which, you know, we continue to, you know, need to coexist, you know, on some terms or other. And it’s going to be hard for us to meet many of our own objectives, you know, whether that’s, you know, meeting our climate objectives, without, you know, continuing to do business with Chinese entities, many of whom are, you know, innovating in clean tech. And so, I think it’s very unfortunate when you have, you know, people like Virginia Governor Youngkin, you know, suggesting, you know, a Ford battery plant that uses or license as Chinese technology, where they are ahead of the U.S. in that technology, saying, well, we don’t — you know, that would be, you know, like letting the Chinese communist party inside our gates. And that’s an own goal. That is not helping us or, you know, Americans, to be kind of this major reactiveness. But it’s really, you know, I think part of the broader dynamic that we face here in the United States where, you know, taking shots at one another and kind of targeting the Chinese boogeyman seems, you know, politically beneficial.

ISAACSON: Part of this targeting of what you called the Chinese boogeyman, you see it in various states, you’ve mentioned Glenn Youngkin, but also, in places like Texas, where they say, the right to buy land by Chinese nationals. Explain what they are doing there and what effect you think that might have.

WEISS: So, in many different state legislatures, there are consideration of bans on the foreign ownership sort of adversary nationals of a foreign adversary, of land or real estate. The security threat here is not particularly crystal clear. You might say that there are certain pieces of land near military sites that you might want to be particularly careful with and have kind of a mechanism to scrutinize that. But a blanket ban on foreign ownership of real estate is — you know, goes against everything that, you know, we stand for. This is a land that was built by immigrants. And frankly, a lot of our competitiveness, you know, in high-tech areas really depends upon, you know, the kind of emigration and assimilation of foreign talents into the United States. And so, even if there is a carve out for, you know, permanent residence, people who have — are on the pathway to citizenship, that pathway is very long and there are — you know, first, they come over as graduate students and stay here as post docs and then, you know, go off into industry. And these folks want to contribute, you know, to American scientific and technological leadership. But surveys suggest that 60 percent of Asian American scientists of Chinese origin, you know, say that they feel unwelcome and are thinking about leaving. And so, we want to, here in the United States, continue to lead in innovating on these technologies. We also have to nurture the talent that is going to allow the United States to remain at this frontier.

ISAACSON: I’d like to try to understand what is the cause of this great and growing conflict we seem to be having with China politically. Obviously, it’s an authoritarian state and it goes against many of our values, the Uyghur and things, but should we take a more realistic approach and say, fine, we’re not going to try to interfere in the internal dynamics of China and we just have to look at our own national interests and be competitors with China, but not be in the conflict with China?

WEISS: I think you’ve put your finger on it, Walter. I think we do need to and I think the administration has already, you know, recognized that our strategy is not trying to change China. That was the narrative for decades. However, I think misplaced that, you know, the United States was engaging with China in order to liberalize China. I don’t think that was really the story. This was really, first of all, about standing up to the Soviet Union. Then, overtime, there’s a whole variety of interests that we, you know, pursued with China. And ultimately, it was better to have them on the inside of these institutions than the outside. That remains the case, even though China is no longer liberalizing politically or economically. And so, the question is, how do you find a modus viventi with the, you know, second largest economy in the world when it is armed with nuclear weapons and that is, you know, to date, I think it’s very showing itself, you know, under Xi Jinping, you know, quite capable of giving is good as they get. And I think that, right now, what we really ought to be looking for is a way to figure out, how is it that we, the United States, can be secure and to what extent does that run through lowering tensions with China, including in this domain, which is what you put your finger on, which is this question about neutral interference in each other’s affairs.

ISAACSON: But let me push back on that a little bit, which is, isn’t it a strength of our foreign policy and us as a nation that we stand for certain values and we try to promote those values overseas or is that causes an inevitable conflict with China we shouldn’t have?

WEISS: So, I think there are many ways to stand for our values. And I think that, already, we are seeing, I think, at the national level a recognition. We can stand for our values by being an example to the world, which is very different from going around the world, putting our thumb on that ledger and trying to shift that balance of power domestically in our favor. And so, I would say, here, we might want to do a lot more on the side of helping those who are already democratic, stay democratic and deepen their democracy and do a little less to exacerbate the insecurities of authoritarian leaders around the world. That’s not to say that we love, obviously (INAUDIBLE). I — you know, I want to see, you know, democracies light continues to shine, but we need to do, first, the work here at home and then, we have to also recognize that we need to prioritize the use of American resources and political capital around the world where it will be most effective and not counterproductive. And so, I would say that, you know, starting with that kind of core group of democracies would be an important place to start in that effort.

ISAACSON: I’m going to read you something you wrote in Foreign Affairs called “The China Trap.” And you write, the need to clarify the conditions under which the United States would welcome or except Chinese initiatives rather than reflexively opposing them. What do you mean about reflexively opposing them? Is that some political problem we have here? And what affirmative vision would you suggest that we propose?

WEISS: I feel we are going to continue to be in this reflexive reactive position where the impetus is always, if the Chinese, you know, government puts forward a new institution, like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank or now we have the Global Security Initiative, the instinct is to say, China bad, without thinking about what is it that we want and to what extent are there overlapping with elements of what China is proposing and what we would ultimately desire such that we could say, well, here is the, you know, pieces of what China is proposing that are OK and here’s what’s not OK. And if we could work out what that overlap is, that’s an area where we can at least, you know, agree not to necessarily get in each other’s way, even if we are not fully cooperating or collaborating in that endeavor.

ISAACSON: You said that the reflexive criticism of China is part of an echo chamber, almost, that people do not want to appear soft on China, in both parties, they don’t want to appear soft on China until they get in this echo chamber. You were in the State Department at the beginning of the Biden administration. Isn’t it true of Democrats and the Biden administration that they are a little bit afraid of being seen as soft on China?

WEISS: This goes back to this question of, is there any political upside domestically of raising inconvenient questions given the broader mood, which is one of, let’s get tough on China. And it’s not just the State Department, it’s not just the Biden administration. I would say that this dynamic of out talking each other is really present on Capitol Hill, as well as in, you know, think tanks and the broader policy conversation. And, you know, obviously, there are people who are genuinely and sincerely committed to their — both, you know, very, you know, dire assessments of what China is doing and the kinds of policies we ought to take in response. But I have heard directly from people inside and outside government that they wouldn’t necessarily agree but they don’t want to stick out their neck to question those views, and even go further to echo them, to want to be, you know, as hawkish as the next guy in order to not be attacked politically. And so, to me, that suggests a real problem in our broader conversation, which makes it hard to think about, where are we going? What are the results of the policies that we are adopting? How do we fashion them in ways that deliver for the American people, as opposed to just sound tough on China? Because ultimately, standing up to China isn’t a strategy, it’s not a policy. And ultimately, we are going to have to figure out, you know, how are we going to continue to survive in this world and avoid what I fear is a looming crisis or conflict with China, in part as a result of our inability to prioritize, as well as offer these clear choices. Where if China does this, they can expect that. But if they choose a less escalatory option, they could also expect some degree of restraint on our side. And right now, the domestic politics of this all point in one direction, which gives me a little, you know, confidence or comfort that we are even interested in figuring out, you know, some kind of modus vivende.

ISAACSON: Jessica Chen Weiss, thank you so much for joining us.

WEISS: Thank you. It’s been a pleasure.