IAEA Head on Iran’s Expansion of Its Nuclear Abilities

BIANNA GOLODRYGA, SENIOR GLOBAL AFFAIRS ANALYST: Well, coming up next, to the use of nuclear power in our ever-changing world. The first ever Nuclear Energy Summit took place in Brussels last week, with several European countries calling for more growth in the sector, hoping that it could help hit climate targets and reduce reliance on Russian gas and oil. But this comes at a time when concerns are growing about Iran’s and China’s nuclear capabilities. In part two of this conversation with Walter Isaacson, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency Rafael Grossi discusses what we should and shouldn’t be worried about.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

WALTER ISAACSON, CO-HOST, AMANPOUR AND CO.: Rafael Grossi, welcome back to the show.

RAFAEL GROSSI, DIRECTOR GENERAL, INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY: Yes, it’s my pleasure. Hello.

ISAACSON: Well, let’s talk about Iran. Last month your agency said, I think, that Iran had actually reduced its quantity of weapons-grade nuclear, while sort of expanding its whole nuclear program. Tell me, does that mean we’re getting into a better position vis-a-vis Iran, or are you still pessimistic?

GROSSI: Not necessarily. Of course, we informed that because we are objective and we have to inform what the inventory in terms of enriched uranium actually is without speculating or politicizing. We are like an international auditor, if you want. So, we said that, but because it was a report that was coming after another report of a previous quarter. But the general trend is a trend of increase of nuclear material enriched at a very, very high level. So, the Iran issue is a very complex one. It has many, many aspects, not only the amount of enriched uranium, which is very important because this is the stuff from — you know, which nuclear weapons are made, or at least essentially for its explosive capacity. But there are other things that have to do with the capacity that my inspectors have to have a full visibility of what is going on there. And this is what I have been saying has been steadily reduced. We are there. I don’t want to mislead you or confuse the audience. The idea is there. We are expecting — not expecting at the levels and with the depth that we should be given the nature of that program. So, you know, I’m telling my Iranian counterparts, we want to engage, we want to reignite this process. Diplomacy is indispensable. As you know, the agreement that existed, the so-called JCPOA that had been signed in 2015, among the five permanent members of the Security Council in Germany has, in essence, abandoned or it hasn’t been declared dead, but it is an empty shell at the moment. Nobody is following its provisions. And there is no diplomacy. There is no conversation. And yet again, the IAEA is the only link that provides some visibility of what’s happening there and trying to bring people together. So, we are worried. At the same time, we are cool-headed and we are, you know, persevering in our desire to engage more diplomatically with Iran. This is indispensable.

ISAACSON: Does that mean there’s some possibility in your mind we could get back to that joint agreement that we had with Iran?

GROSSI: I don’t know if we will — I mean, it’s up to the parties. I mean, I’m not a party to that agreement. I was the inspector of that agreement. So, we were expecting what they agreed politically. So, I’m not at the political table. I am at the technical table. And they can go back to that or have something else. Everything is possible. One thing I should say, and it’s that, that agreement, back in 2015, was predicated upon a certain number of — or a certain type of technologies and capacities and capabilities, but this was 10 years ago. So, 2024, 2025, almost, is 10 years after that agreement was signed. So, Iran has now much faster, more efficient, more performing centrifuges. Iran has more facilities producing the parts of those, is developing, constructing new sites where the nuclear activities are taking place. So, the spectrum, if you want, of that agreement is clearly superseded at this point. So, maybe for political reasons, they will continue to say, we have to go back to that agreement, OK, fine with us. But the reality is that the Iran of 2015 is not the Iran of 2020.

ISAACSON: The main role of your agency when it comes to Iran is as inspectors to try to figure out exactly what’s happening there. And you say you’ve been suffering from a lack of transparency. I want to read you a quote, which is kind of a frightening quote, and have you explain it. You said, the agency has lost continuity of knowledge in relation to Iran’s production and inventory of centrifuges, rotors, bellows, heavy water, and uranium ore content. That seems pretty bad. What happens when you push the Iranians and say, we have to have more transparency?

GROSSI: Well, they tell us you cannot see that because this was part of the JCPOA verification mandate or permissions, if you want, that the agency used to have. So, JCPOA was abandoned. Here’s our retaliation. You cannot do this — you cannot perform these functions anymore. My argument, why they do not deny that this may be a fact, is a different one. My argument is that the more we continue in this situation with Iran growing its capacities and producing all these things that you mentioned, the more difficult it will be if one day, and we hope that will be the case, the actors that be, the powers that be, Washington, London, Paris, Moscow, Beijing, want to go back to an agreement. The first thing they will say is, they will say, heavy segregation (ph), please go to Iran and tell us exactly what do they have. So, we know what we should cut or restrict or leave it, isn’t it? It’s a simple logic. And at this point, with all this activity that takes place without my eyes and ears having access to that, how am I going to do that? So, this is an argument that I also use, if I can use the verb, with my Iranian counterparts. I tell them, listen, you’ll keep saying that you want to go back to an agreement. If you keep not allowing me to do my job now, the day when you want to go back, I will not be able to sign anything on the door. Like, this is clear. I will have to know exactly. Otherwise, instead of an agreement, you will have an illusion of an agreement. This is why it may be a bit techie. It may sound a little bit obscure (ph), all of this, but it’s very concrete. We need to restore the verification capabilities now so that we can have a more stable situation in the future.

ISAACSON: Well, wait, what if Iran won’t do that? What can be done?

GROSSI: If Iran does not do that, we will be approaching a point where the agency will be — or I will have to say that I am prevented from giving the credible assurance that are needed, that we know exactly that the Iranian nuclear program is entirely in fiscal (ph) uses, because I will have lost this ability. I will not do that. Let me give you a reference. In the 1990s — 1980, late 1980s, that happened in Iraq, where the agency believed and the world believed that everything was correct. But many things were happening without the inspectors and my predecessors knowing it. We learned from that sad experience. We don’t want to go back to that. I don’t think it’s in anybody’s interest, including us, starting with Iran, both. I want to begin. So, you know, shutting inspectors out, telling inspectors go away is never, never a good idea.

ISAACSON: I read somewhere that Iran has the capability, I think, of creating with its program 13 nuclear weapons, seven within the month of a breakout. In other words, if they break out and decide to just go for it. Tell me, how soon do you think Iran could create a nuclear weapon?

GROSSI: Again, let me be objective, you know, some analysts can have the luxury of saying those things. First of all, Iran does not have nuclear weapons today, as we speak. So, we have to be very objective here. Iran is accumulating a vast amount of highly enriched uranium. And this is something that, of course, draws our attention because no other country without nuclear weapons is enriching at these high levels. Another point I would draw attention to is that a nuclear weapon requires more than highly enriched uranium or plutonium to go bang. All right. It is a complex system that requires other things. Normally, those pursuing nuclear weapons test them, like the North Koreans did. So, there are a number of things. I say this because alarmism is also a bad idea. It is, of course, concerning. We are in a trajectory that is not good. We have to persuade Iran to come back to full cooperation with us. But, of course, we are not in a scenario where we have nuclear weapons in that country.

ISAACSON: I think there are about 413 nuclear power plants operating around the world, 31 countries, 10 percent of the energy of the world, and maybe a very high percentage of the renewable energy. How important do you think it is that we build more nuclear power plants, and what are you doing to encourage that?

GROSSI: It’s indispensable. It’s indispensable. The international consensus, as agreed in the last Climate Change Conference in Dubai, in November, is that nuclear should be accelerated together with renewables, another fossil fuel-free or CO2-free energies. So, out of that proportion that you mentioned, we should mention that 25 percent of the clean energy in the world is of nuclear origin right now. So, this is why we are having a Nuclear Energy Summit in Brussels where leaders from all over the world are coming, because they have come to the realization that if you want to go to net zero or to a decarbonized energy matrix by 2050 or whatever that may be, without nuclear it would be close to impossible. So, the IAEA is the international platform for operation. We are the inspectors that prevent this nuclear material being used for hostile purposes. We are ensuring that the energy is safe and secure. So, for us, it’s a very important moment. There’s a 30-point here that we are seeing. And in this sense, we feel really excited.

ISAACSON: China is expanding its nuclear arsenal at a pace we haven’t seen countries do for 30 or 40 years. You recently met with Chinese officials. What did you say to them and what’s your prognosis there?

GROSSI: Well, China is one of the most, I would say, dynamic countries in terms of increasing their nuclear share, nuclear energy share. They have 30 something reactors. And as we speak, they are building more than 20, constructing more than 20 reactors. That being said, the proportion, the general — the overall proportion of nuclear energy in the energy mix continues to be quite low. I think it’s very important because, as you know, the Chinese energy mix is highly dependent on coal and other CO2 heavy emitters. So, the fact that they are increasing the nuclear share is in itself a very important thing. It’s like in India, for example, you have the same situation and I think it’s very positive. But we are seeing more nuclear here in Europe, maybe for other reasons, maybe energy security. The war in Ukraine is bating (ph) countries look at nuclear energy with renewed enthusiasm. We see it in the United States, where they — I mean, it’s at a time of great difficulty and divide. It enjoys bipartisan support now, nuclear energy, or in big countries in Europe, in Latin America, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, South Africa, I mean, Korea, Japan, in spite of the traumatic experience of Fukushima, the 18 nuclear accidents. So, I think it is an important moment for nuclear. It is a promising time for nuclear. And we — as IAEA are present there to make sure that it happens in the best possible condition.

ISAACSON: But one of the concerns on China is not just their energy program, they’re building an arsenal of nuclear weapons at the pace of which we haven’t seen in decades. What can be done to stop that? And Jake Sullivan, our national security adviser, said he wants nuclear arms talks. Can you all push for that?

GROSSI: Well, I would say that the two things are different, and I would advise to separate them. One thing is that China is in nuclear energy, in peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and something different is what is happening in terms of nuclear weapons and what they are doing in that regard. I think the second logic is a logic that has to do more with the geostrategic tensions than anything else. And there, I think, what we said before about more diplomacy and more dialogue applies.

ISAACSON: You asked recently what keeps you up at night, and your answer surprised me, it wasn’t about any of the nuclear plants or the arsenals, it was that people in Africa can’t get radiation therapy. Explain that to me and what are you all doing.

GROSSI: Well, the other side, very important side of nuclear technology, is everything that can be done to improve the lives and livelihoods of people. And of course, we have all been touched by — in our families, in our lives, by cancer. And as you know, radiotherapy is an essential part of any therapy. And in many countries, in any continent, I would say, the availability of radiotherapy is almost non-existent. So, the IAEA has launched a program called Rays of Hope, where we are trying to do just that, put nuclear medicine, radiotherapy at the disposal of people who normally do not have it.

ISAACSON: Rafael Grossi, thank you so much for joining us.

GROSSI: It’s been a great pleasure. Thank you very much.