Russia-Ukraine, Israel-Gaza: A Look at U.S. Foreign Policy

BIANNA GOLODRYGA, SENIOR GLOBAL AFFAIRS ANALYST: Let’s turn now to a day of U.S. diplomatic efforts to push for peace in Gaza. A delta blow by the U N. Security Council once again, who failed to pass a U.S. resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire. It was a major tonal shift for the White House after months of vetoing other resolutions, suggesting a departure from previous policy towards Israel. This, while U.S. military aid to Ukraine continues to hang in the balance in Congress as a prospect of another Trump presidency, casts a shadow over Ukraine’s future on the battlefield as we’ve just been discussing. President of the Council on Foreign Relations joins Walter Isaacson to discuss how shifting U.S. foreign policy is resonating in Washington and beyond.

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WALTER ISAACSON, CO-HOST, AMANPOUR AND CO.: Thank you, Bianna. And Michael Froman, welcome to the show.

MICHAEL FROMAN, PRESIDENT, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS: Thanks for having me.

ISAACSON: This week, Congress has still been wrestling with Ukraine aid. Now, there’s an idea that maybe it should be a loan that’s perhaps waivable. How important is it to you that they settle it? And is this idea of doing it as a loan, does that make sense?

FROMAN: Well, I think it is absolutely critical that they settle. That’s perhaps the most important thing that Ukraine knows that the money is going to be there, that Russia knows that the support is going to be there. I think it is significantly better for it to be a grant as it has been before, but the most important thing is for Congress to act and to demonstrate that the U.S. stands behind Ukraine at this critical moment.

ISAACSON: Even if this happens, it seems like this is not going to be a forever thing. Certainly, if Donald Trump is elected, but even now, it looks unlikely that they’ll continue to do aid year after year. Isn’t it time to have some peace process that would try to at least get us to a truce or a standstill? Or what should we be doing?

FROMAN: Look, I think ultimately everybody wants to get there. I think the question is, do you get there with Ukrainians coming to the table from a position of strength or from a position of weakness? If Congress does not act, they’ll be coming to the table from a position of weakness. If Congress does act, they have the wherewithal to get through this year to try and make as many gains as they can on the battlefield, and very importantly, to avoid problems on the battlefield, prevent Russia from making gains on the battlefield. Then there’s at least some hope that when the parties decide that negotiations are appropriate, that there’ll be a decent outcome. I think the risk right now is that without the support from Congress, Ukraine may be forced to the table in a way that’s very much disadvantageous.

ISAACSON: Well, so if you do get to the table, what do you think an outcome could be?

FROMAN: Well, that’s going to be a very hard set of issues. I mean, there’s a whole range. It’s hard to imagine Russia giving up territory that it has gained, and it’s hard to imagine the Ukrainians accepting that as a long-term proposition. I think one idea that has been put out there is something not unlike what happened in the Korean peninsula at the end of the Korean War, where there was a truce but not a final peace settlement, and there was a series of compromises and security guarantees that allowed both sides to find it acceptable. The Ukrainians will not be happy about that. Giving up both the Eastern Ukraine and Crimea, even in the short run, is not something that will be prepared to do. But I think what will be determining this is how much progress there is on the ground and how much the Russians feel the need to make a compromise. I think one thing that could change the dynamic, Walter, is that if — I think President Putin believes that time is on his side, both because Russia has dug into very strong defensive positions in Eastern Ukraine, and because, frankly, he’s waiting to see what the outcome of the U.S. election is and whether the support will be there from Congress in the meantime. I think one thing that could change that is if President Putin felt he was losing some control over Crimea, which is of course extremely important to him and to Russia and his image of Russia. And if the wherewithal that we provide Ukraine gives them the capability of shaking some of that security around Crimea, then that could potentially bring the support to the table earlier.

ISAACSON: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has agreed, at the request of President Biden, to send a delegation to Washington to talk about whether or not to do a military operation in Rafah and how to do it. What do you hope comes out of these discussions?

FROMAN: I think, hopefully, that will turn the temperature down a bit between the United States and Israel. U.S. is now Israel’s really, if not the only source of support, certainly the strongest remaining source of support. And we’ve seen that fray with Senator Schumer’s speech send a general tension between the administration and Prime Minister Netanyahu. So, hopefully, turn down the temperature. I think that has to be related to actually substantive progress on the underlying issues, which is on one hand, of course, Israel has the right to defend itself, Israel has the right to try and eliminate Hamas as a security threat on its border. The question is at this point, on the verge of going into Rafah, will there be a strong humanitarian element to that operation? What happens to the million or so Gazans who are being asked to go back to the north who are in desperate need of humanitarian assistance? Back in the north, 70 percent of the buildings have been damaged. So, where are they going back to and will there be a housing component to that? Can we get humanitarian aid into Gaza in a meaningful way? And that means beyond airdrops, beyond building a port into the Mediterranean Sea, really opening up the roads, both from Egypt and potentially from the north, from Israel, for significant truck traffic to bring in the food and the other humanitarian supplies that are so desperately needed. And of course, we’re not talking as much as we should be talking about the hostages. How do we get the 100 or so hostages that remain in Gaza under Hamas control out and safely home?

ISAACSON: Well, let’s talk about humanitarian aid, because I don’t get it. I mean, there’s a famine, there’s widespread deep hunger in Gaza. Why would the U.S. and Israel not want to try to get a humanitarian aid in as fast as possible?

FROMAN: Well, like you said, very much in certainly the U.S. interests and Israel’s interests to do so. I think what we’ve seen is that the trucks that have come to the border, to the Rafah Crossing, have been turned away sometimes for having reports of surgical scissors or other things that were deemed to be potentially dangerous. Part of this operation, part of the near-term focus, needs to be working with Egypt to ensure that whatever comes into Gaza at this point is not strengthening Hamas, not giving Hamas tools and weapons to be used against the Israelis, not allowing them to replenish their strength. And there needs to be a process for doing that, but doing it efficiently so we can get humanitarian aid back into Gaza. But there needs to be a real plan, Walter. And I think one of the things that Israel has been criticized for is as they’ve gone into Gaza, and certainly as they prepare to go into Rafah specifically, that there hasn’t been enough attention for how to ensure that the Palestinians there will be cared for as they have to displace themselves again to get out of harm’s way. And making the humanitarian element a key part of the overall operation is got to be part of this.

ISAACSON: What do you see as an eventual outcome for Gaza?

FROMAN: Look, I think it’s a really difficult question right now. Because on one hand, it needs to be a situation where Israel is secure. Israel is not going to live with a Gaza that is a source of insecurity for it going forward. There’s no interest in allowing or encouraging the Palestinians in Gaza to move elsewhere. So, there’s going to be an enormous rebuilding effort that needs to happen, a security effort that needs to happen. And then, you know, making Gaza a livable, sustainable place over time. That’s going to require the involvement of not just the United States and Israel, but of Saudi Arabia, other Arab nations, Egypt, who can play a role in helping to secure Gaza and ensure that it’s got the investment necessary to survive. The other big issue, Walter, is who’s going to rule Gaza? What are the — what’s the political situation in Gaza? And the Palestinian Authority has very little credibility among Palestinians. Hamas will not be permitted to govern Gaza by Israel. And there’s not been the kind of investment, particularly by the surrounding Arab nations over the years, in supporting and cultivating a strong Palestinian administrative state to be able to take control both of Gaza and the West Bank. And so, that is the next step. I think that it may take years for that to happen, but there’s no time like the present to begin to invest in that.

ISAACSON: You’re sitting in the Council on Foreign Relations building, as you can tell, wood paneled, wonderful molding. It’s been there for a century or so. And on the walls of that building, I know, are sort of the great elder statesmen of American foreign policy, Democrats and Republicans who work together in a nonpartisan way. That seems to have broken down in this country. Tell me, what are the causes of that, and what do you do at the Council now that this nonpartisan consensus no longer exists?

FROMAN: I think it’s so important. I mean, it used to be, there was this phrase, the politics stopped at the water’s edge. And when it got into foreign policy, there was a broad consensus around the role of the United States in the world, around the open liberal market-based economies, around democracy. All of that is very much at risk right now. And I don’t think we should overstate it. There are still a lot of Republicans and a lot of Democrats who agree on the fundamental principles of that, of internationalism of the U.S. playing a constructive role in the world. They may disagree over some of the tactics and how far to go, how long to commit, but I think that the role of the U.S. as a very critical nation and its leadership being needed on so many issues is recognized by many. Having said that, there’s been a long tradition in the United States of isolationism, and we now see it on elements of both parties, but particularly in the Republican Party. The Council was founded over a century ago precisely to address the risk of isolationism and the understanding that our interests and the interests of the American people are so closely tied to what goes on around the world that it’s important for the U.S. to be engaged and to show leadership. And those very same dynamics are present today and we’re very much active in trying to bring together Republicans and Democrats as broad a coalition responsible to talk about these issues and to talk about how the U.S. should exercise that leadership.

ISAACSON: Is there something we got wrong in that globalism consensus and there’s some rationale to the backlash against it — that’s happening not only in the United States but around the world?

FROMAN: So, I think if we look back over the last several decades, the opening up of economies, the integration of them has had enormous positive impacts in general. It’s lifted hundreds of millions if not billions out of abject poverty. It’s allowed really all the human development indicators to be improved, it has brought nations closer together in a number of respects. I think what was clear though is that the benefits of that integration have not been broadly and equally shared. And so that, between nations and within nations, there were winners and losers. And the impact on those who were left behind were not fully addressed. Just take the United States as an example. I think this — by the way, it cuts across both Democratic and Republican administrations. We never paired our focus on integrating the global economy with sufficient domestic policy to take care of those who would be adversely affected in the short or the medium-term. And we saw the impact of this on communities as factories close, as manufacturing shrunk. And as there were no — there wasn’t sufficient social safety net and programs to help people really develop and transition to new industries and those new industries to be invested in their communities to take up the slack. And that, I think, has led to populism and protectionism, some nativism and nationalism as well. And we see that not just in the United States, we see it in some other countries as well, but we see it particularly in our politics.

ISAACSON: What do you think the election of Donald Trump would mean for American foreign policy?

FROMAN: You know, when I travel around the world, the concerns I hear are about American isolationism and about our political dysfunctionality. Those are the two major risks that the rest of the world sees when they look at the United States. We have a little bit of dysfunctionality right now, witness Congress not being able to act on the aid for Ukraine, Israel, Taiwan, et cetera. But I think when the world looks at the choice that we’ll face in November, they view President Trump as being more isolationist, and that very much scares them. And so, you know, of course, we don’t know exactly what policy President Biden would pursue in the next — in a second term, nor Former President Trump, if he were to be reelected. But I think the broad consensus is it’s likely to be more isolationist, less focus on alliances and partnerships, and that will have ramifications more broadly for how our policy is implemented around the world.

ISAACSON: Can you understand, though, the appeal that that has in some parts of America? And to the extent you think it’s wrong, what can you do to counter it?

FROMAN: So, I think I do understand the appeal. And as I said, it’s not new. I mean, isolationism has always here really since the beginning of the Republic. I mean, with this George Washington’s farewell address about entangling alliances is warning about that. And we certainly saw it earlier in the 20th century between World War I and World War II. But I think the 20th century, and President Biden made reference to this at the beginning of the State of the Union, the 20th century holds out some very important lessons for us, which is by withdrawing from the world, it doesn’t mean that things aren’t going to happen outside our borders that affect us. And I think right now, let’s just focus on Ukraine. The Ukraine war is very importantly about the Ukrainians and their national aspirations, but it’s much bigger and broader than that. It’s about whether countries can challenge the fundamental principles of international order and stability, that is the agreement not to use force to change borders. And I think a lot of countries are looking at Ukraine, whether it’s China and its concerns about — its focus on Taiwan or countries all across other regions of the world, who would say, well, look, if we can redress our grievances around where borders are drawn, if that becomes the new normal, well, it’s going to be an outbreak of a lot of conflicts and a lot of wars, and that has an implication for us here at home. The same thing, obviously, on the economic issues. I understand that free trade is not in fashion right now. There’s been a big reaction against it, but when people begin to see, OK, well, what does it mean for my getting the availability of goods at an affordable price? And particularly for people who are spending a disproportionate amount of their disposable income on imports, which tends to be people with a lower levels of income, they’ll begin to see they don’t like inflation, they don’t like high cost of living, how do we strike that balance? How do we make sure we’re not throwing out the baby with the bathwater when it comes to some of these issues? I think we need to do a much better job. By we, I mean people in government, people in institutions, people in education, of just making clear what’s at stake. Why does it matter? Why does Ukraine matter to somebody in the middle of the country? And is it because if we’re not supporting Ukrainians, we may find ourselves sending our own soldiers to war in one place or another? Is it because it’s going to disrupt the supply of food and other fertilizer and other goods in such a way that it can have an implication back here at home, including at the grocery store? What is it that we — how do we make those issues relevant to people at home? And then making clear, as I said, what the trade-offs are of the different policy options that are available to us.

ISAACSON: Michael Froman, thank you so much for joining us.

FROMAN: Thanks for having me.